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To Be Announced: Silence from the
United States Supreme Court and
Disagreement among Lower Courts
Suggest an Uncertain Future for
Class-Wide Arbitration
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle l
I. INTRODUCTION
With growth in the area of arbitration agreements relating to employment,
credit cards, loans, and other form agreements, the issue of class-wide arbitration
has become an area of significant judicial activity.2 However, increased judicial
activity has not resulted in increased clarity; to the dismay of those parties seeking
to pursue or avoid class-wide arbitration, the law on this issue has become unpre-
dictable from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court has
expressed the importance of the class-action as a valuable device for vindicating
plaintiffs' rights. Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized arbitration as a
valuable form of dispute resolution.4 In contrast, when the class-action and arbi-
tration are found in the form of class-wide arbitration, the Supreme Court has been
less than swift in establishing binding precedent for the lower courts to follow.5
Although the Bazzle decision was concerned primarily with whether silent agree-
ments preclude class-wide arbitration, this casenote will address class-wide arbi-
tration in general, and the manner in which the Supreme Court treated the issue in
Bazzle.
I. 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003).
2. Richard Jeydel, Consolidation, Joinder and Class Actions: What Arbitrators and Courts May
and May Not Do, DisP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2002 - Jan. 2003, at 24, 26.
3. See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338-39 (1980). The Court summarized as
follows:
[I]t may motivate [plaintiffs] to bring cases that for economic reasons might not be brought oth-
erwise ... [thereby] vindicating the rights of individuals who otherwise might not consider it
worth the candle to embark on litigation in which the optimum result might be more than con-
sumed by the cost.
Id. at 338. See also Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974) ("Economic reality
dictates that petitioner's suit proceed as a class action or not at all.").
4. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
5. Most recently, the unwillingness of the court to decide the class-wide arbitration debate is evi-
denced by the majority opinion in Bazzle, and the denial of a request for certiorari in Ting v. AT & T,
182 F. Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Cal. 2002), affd in part and rev'd in part, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003),
cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 53 (2003).
1
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1I. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1995, Lynn and Burt Bazzle secured a home improvement loan from Green
Tree Financial Corporation (Green Tree).6 The contract entered into by the parties
included an arbitration clause that stated in relevant part: "[AII disputes, claims,
or controversies arising from or relating to this contract or the relationships which
result from this contract ... shall be resolved by binding arbitration by one arbi-
trator selected by us, with consent of you."'7  In separate transactions, Daniel
Lackey and George and Florine Buggs entered into loan contracts and security
agreements with Green Tree that contained arbitration clauses that were essen-
tially identical to the Bazzles' arbitration clause.8 Both sets of customers thereaf-
ter filed separate actions in South Carolina state courts, complaining that Green
Tree had violated the attorney and insurance agent provision of the South Carolina
Consumer Protection Code. 9
In April 1997, the Bazzles filed a motion for class certification. 1 Later,"'
Green Tree filed a motion to stay the court proceedings and compel arbitration.
1 2
The court granted the Bazzles' motion for class certification, and issued an order
compelling arbitration.' 3 An arbitrator administered the arbitration proceedings as
a class. After finding Green Tree liable for violating the attorney and insurance
preference requirements of the Consumer Protection Code, the arbitrator awarded
the class $10,935,000 in statutory damages, in addition to attorney's fees.' 4 Green
Tree filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's order granting class
certification. 15 The trial court denied the motion, and Green Tree appealed to the
South Carolina Court of Appeals claiming that class arbitration was legally im-
permissible. 16
In a similar proceeding, Lackey and the Buggses sought class certification for
their claim, and Green Tree moved to compel arbitration. 7 The trial court denied
Green Tree's motion to compel arbitration, finding the arbitration agreement to be
unenforceable.' 8 The South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the
6. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2405.
7. Id.
8. Id. The Lackey and Buggses' contracts substituted the word "you" with the word "Buyer[s]" in
the italicized phrase. Id.
9. Id. Green Tree had apparently failed to provide the customers with a legally required form that
would have informed them of their right to name their own lawyers and insurance agents. Id.
10. Id.
11. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 353 (S.C. 2002).




16. Id. Green Tree argued that the arbitrator failed to enforce the arbitration clause in accordance
with its terms, in violation of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), when class-wide arbitration was
imposed. Id. Green Tree based this argument on the reasoning employed by the Seventh Circuit in
Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1999). Id. Section 4 of the FAA requires arbitra-
tion to be in "accordance with the terms" of the agreement. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000). According to the
Seventh Circuit, if the arbitration agreement in question is silent on the issue, authorizing class-wide
arbitration would not be in accordance with the terms of the agreement. Champ, 55 F.3d at 269. See
also Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Disc. Co., 828 F. Supp. 673 (D. Minn. 1993).
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case, holding that the contract was not unconscionable.' 9 The parties then ap-
pointed the Honorable Thomas Ervin as arbitrator.20 The arbitrator held a hearing
to determine if class-wide arbitration was permissible under the contract's arbitra-
tion clause. 2' At the hearing, Green Tree challenged the arbitrator's authority to
order class arbitration under the FAA and the arbitration agreement at issue.22
The arbitrator issued an order permitting class-wide arbitration and ultimately
ruled that Green Tree had violated the attorney and insurance agent preference
requirements of the Consumer Protection Code. The arbitrator awarded the class
$9.2 million in damages, in addition to attorney's fees.23 Green Tree thereafter
appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals claiming, as in the Bazzle dis-
pute, that class-wide arbitration was legally impermissible.24
The South Carolina Supreme Court withdrew both of the cases from the court
of appeals and assumed jurisdiction to hear the consolidated Bazzle and Lackey
appeals.25 The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the contracts were silent
as to the issue of class arbitration and that "class-wide arbitration may be ordered
when the arbitration agreement is silent if it would serve efficiency and equity,
and would not result in prejudice. 26 The court upheld the Bazzle and Lackey
awards concluding that, in light of the contractual silence with regard to class
arbitration, the contracts authorized class arbitration, and that arbitration had
properly taken that form.
27
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the
South Carolina Supreme Court decision was consistent with the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act.28 However, rather than settling the issue of whether class certification is
permissible when contracts do not expressly authorize class certification, the Su-
preme Court, in a plurality decision, vacated the judgment of the South Carolina
Supreme Court and held that the question of contract interpretation in this case
was for the arbitrator, not the judge, to decide.29
19. Lackey v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 498 S.E.2d 898 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998).
20. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 353 (S.C. 2002). Interestingly, the Honorable
Thomas Ervin was chosen to arbitrate the Bazzles' dispute as well. Id. at 352.
21. Id.
22. Id. Although not expressed in the opinion, Green Tree's argument was likely based on the same
reasoning as that set forth supra note 16.
23. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2406. After the arbitrator issued the order permitting class arbitration,
Green Tree sought declaratory judgment from the federal district court seeking to enjoin the arbitrator
from certifying the class. Bazzle, 569 S.E.2d at 353. The district court denied the injunction and
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 354. Green Tree then filed a motion to stay the
arbitration proceedings in state court. Id. The trial court denied the stay because it lacked jurisdiction
to interfere with the arbitration and noted that it found class actions and arbitrations to be compatible.
Id.
24. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2406.
25. Id.
26. Bazzle, 569 S.E.2d at 360. The South Carolina Supreme Court chose to base its argument on
precedent from the California Court of Appeals in Blue Cross v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998), cert denied, 527 U.S. 1003 (1999), which held that allowing class-wide arbitra-
tion can further, rather than defeat, the FAA's goal of enforcing agreements to arbitrate and is therefore
not preempted by Section 4 of the FAA. Id.
27. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2406.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2407. The Supreme Court based its holding on language in the arbitration clauses which
stated that the parties agreed to submit to the arbitrator "[a]ll disputes, claims, or controversies arising
from or relating to this contract or the relationships which result from this contract," and, therefore, the
2004]
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) requires federal courts to en-
force arbitration agreements as agreed by the parties. 30 However, problems such
as the one presented in Bazzle arise when an arbitration agreement is silent as to
class-wide arbitration. Unfortunately, the FAA does not mention class-wide arbi-
tration, and the U.S. Supreme Court has failed to give any guidance on whether
class-wide arbitration is permissible when an agreement is silent on the matter.
31
In turn, state and federal courts have struggled, if not failed, to establish a cogent
body of law from which one can glean a clear rule governing class-wide arbitra-
tion.32 This disjointed body of authority presents the possibility of confusion and
frustration for multi-jurisdictional parties who frequently draft arbitration agree-
ments, as one forum within the parties' reach may preclude class-wide arbitration
while the other permits it.
The federal circuits have been consistent in prohibiting class-wide arbitration
when an agreement is silent on the issue. 33 A seminal case from this line of au-
thority is Champ v. Siegel Trading Co. ,34 wherein the Seventh Circuit followed the
reasoning of several other circuits and held that Section 4 of the FAA forbids fed-
eral judges from ordering class-wide arbitration where the parties' arbitration
agreement is silent on the issue. 35 The court's decision was based on federal ap-
pellate cases holding that trial courts cannot consolidate arbitral proceedings when
parties seem to have agreed that the issue of whether or not class arbitration is permissible in this case
was to be decided by the arbitrator, not a judge. Id.
30. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000). State courts were not initially bound by the FAA, however, preemption was
extended to state courts in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding that the FAA is a
substantive statute derived from the Commerce Clause, thereby establishing the supremacy of the FAA
over arbitration agreements). The Supreme Court in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 395 (1967) held that the FAA is a body of substantive law that governs arbitration agree-
ments relating to transactions involving interstate commerce. Id. The Court also held that the FAA is
an appropriate exercise of the Congressional power under the Commerce Clause. Id. See Robert
Hollis et al., Comment, Is State Law Looking for Trouble? The Federal Arbitration Act Flexes Its
Preemptive Muscle, 2003 J. D1sP. RESOL. 463, 467-70.
31. Bazzle, 569 S.E.2d at 356.
32. See Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action
Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2000).
33. Bazzle, 569 S.E.2d at 356.
34. 55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995). Champ involved a consumer class action in which the plaintiff
class alleged violations of several state laws, the Commodity Exchange Act, and the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Id. at 271. The district court ordered arbitration and
refused to certify an arbitral class action, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court decision.
Id.
35. Id. See, e.g., Gov't of United Kingdom v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding
that a "district court cannot consolidate arbitration proceedings arising from separate agreements to
arbitrate, absent the parties' agreement to allow such consolidation"). The court in EEOC v. Waffle
House, Inc. stated that the purpose of the FAA is to "place arbitration agreements upon the same foot-
ing as other contracts." 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002). See also Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d
366 (3d Cir. 2000); Am. Centennial Ins. v. Nat'l Gas Co., 951 F.2d 107, 108 (6th Cir. 1991); Baesler v.
Cont'l Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1990); Protective Life Ins. Corp. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life
Ins. Corp., 873 F.2d 281, 282 (11 th Cir. 1989); Del E. Webb Constr. v. Richardson Hosp. Auth., 823
F.2d 145, 150 (5th Cir. 1987); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. W. Seas Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635, 637 (9th Cir.
1984). But see, e.g., New England Energy, Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.
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the parties' agreements do not allow consolidation. 36 The Champ court concluded
that there is "no meaningful basis to distinguish between the failure to provide for
consolidated arbitration and class arbitration," and therefore the FAA's goal to
enforce parties' arbitration agreements as written should be given priority, even if
inefficient. 37 The Seventh Circuit's approach has gained notable following re-
cently, even by several state courts.38
On the opposite end of the spectrum of decisions concerning class-wide arbi-
tration are the cases setting forth the "California Approach, 39 which allows a
court to order class-wide arbitration even if the arbitration agreement is silent on
the issue.40  The most notable of the cases allowing class-wide arbitration is
Keating v. Superior Court,4' wherein the California Supreme Court highlighted
the importance of the class action stating that "the class suit both eliminates the
possibility of repetitious litigation and provides small claimants with a method of
obtaining redress for claims which would otherwise be too small to warrant indi-
vidual litigation.' '42 The California Supreme Court balanced "the potential inequi-
ties and inefficiencies '43 that could result from class-wide arbitration, and held
that the court had the power to order class-wide arbitration, and left the issue to
the trial court to decide on a case-by-case basis.
44
In Blue Cross v. Superior Court,45 a significant decision affirming the "Cali-
fornia Approach," a California court of appeals went even further than the Keating
court and held that the FAA does not preclude application of California's class-
wide arbitration rules. 4 6 In reaching its decision the court stated that while the
36. Champ, 55 F.3d at 275.
37. Id.
38. Bischoff v. DirecTV, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Dominium Austin Partners v.
Emerson, 248 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2001); Arriaga v. Cross Country Bank, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (S.D.
Cal. 2001).
39. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp, 569 S.E.2d 349, 356 (S.C. 2002).
40. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 32, at 68-69 (noting that most of the courts reaching this decision
are California state courts).
41. 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982), revd in part on other grounds, Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S.
1(1984).
42. Keating, 645 P.2d at 1206. Significantly, the U.S. Supreme Court was faced with the opportu-
nity to address the issue of class-wide arbitration on appeal in Keating, but rather reversed the decision
on other grounds and avoided the class-wide arbitration issue. Keating, 465 U.S. at 1.
43. Bazzle, 569 S.E.2d at 357.
44. Keating, 645 P.2d at 1206. The court expressed several factors which should be considered in
determining whether to allow class-wide arbitration including efficiency, equity, and prejudice to the
drafting party which would likely result from class-wide arbitration. Id. at 1210. In a dissenting opin-
ion, Justice Richardson stated that the complications resulting from continued judicial monitoring
required by class-wide arbitration would be self-defeating to the initial purpose of the arbitration proc-
ess. Id. at 1216.
45. 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 779 (1998).
46. Id. The California Statute which the California courts have used to authorize class-wide arbitra-
tion was based on the CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1281.3 (West 2003), which says that parties to an arbitration
agreement may petition the court to consolidate separate arbitration proceedings, and the court may
order consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings when:
(1) Separate arbitration agreements or proceedings exist between the same parties; or one party
is a party to a separate arbitration agreement or proceedings with a third party; and (2) The dis-
putes arise from the same transactions or series of related transactions; and (3) There is common
issue or issues of law or fact creating the possibility of conflicting rulings by more than one arbi-
trator or panel of arbitrators.
2004]
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FAA would preempt a state procedural rule if the two were in direct conflict, state
procedure that furthers rather than defeats the FAA's goal of enforcing agree-
ments to arbitrate is not preempted. 47  Determining that class-wide arbitration
furthers the FAA's goals of enforcing arbitration agreements,4 8 the court con-
cluded that class-wide arbitration should be permissible when an agreement is
silent on the issue. 9
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Principal Opinion
In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,50 the U.S. Supreme Court was faced
with the decision of whether the South Carolina Supreme Court was correct in
holding that class-wide arbitration may be ordered when an arbitration agreement
is silent on the issue.51 However, the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, did
anything but resolve the debate. Instead, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Gins-
berg, Scalia, and Souter, vacated and remanded the South Carolina decision and
held that language in the arbitration agreement indicated that the parties had
agreed to submit the issue of class-wide arbitration to an arbitrator, not a judge.52
Adding more drama to the debate, and signaling his agreement with the Rehnquist
dissent, 53 Justice Stevens expressed that had he adhered to his preferred disposi-
tion of the case, there would have been no controlling judgment of the Court, and
seeking to avoid that outcome he concurred in the judgment of the plurality.54
The plurality treated the issue as one of contract interpretation with their
analysis focusing on language in the contract which stated that "[a]ll disputes,
claims, or controversies arising from or relating to this contract or the relation-
ships which result from this contract" would be submitted to an arbitrator. 55 The
plurality reasoned that a dispute about whether the contract forbids class-wide
arbitration is a dispute "relating to this contract., 5 6 Therefore, the Justices con-
cluded that the parties must have intended to submit to an arbitrator, not a judge,
the issue of class-wide arbitration.57
The plurality went further and analyzed the exceptions in which a court may
assume that parties intended courts, not arbitrators, to decide arbitration related
matters. 5t The Court acknowledged that within the exceptions are issues such as
47. Id.
48. The Blue Cross court relied on Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Sec. Corp., for the proposition that "a
state procedure that serves to further, rather than defeat, full and uniform effectuation of the federal
law's objectives-to ensure that arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms-is to be
followed in California, rather than Section 4 of the FAA." Rosenthal, 926 P.2d 1061 (1996).
49. Blue Cross, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 779.
50. 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See infra Part IV.B.
54. 123 S. Ct. at 2408-09. Justice Stevens also dissented in part. Id
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whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement or whether a binding arbi-
tration agreement applies to a certain type of controversy.
59
Concluding that the question of whether class-wide arbitration is permissible
does not fit within the narrow exceptions, the majority reasoned that the question
is not whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, but is a question of what kind of
arbitration. 60 In turn, the Justices determined that the question at issue was a ques-
tion of contract interpretation and arbitration procedure within the authority of the
arbitrator. 6' The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the South Carolina Su-
preme Court and remanded the case for the arbitrator to decide the question of
whether class-wide arbitration was permissible.
62
B. The Rehnquist Dissent6
3
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy
disagreed with the plurality and concluded that he would have reversed the judg-
ment of the South Carolina Supreme Court. 64 At the outset of the dissenting opin-
ion, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the parties had entered into a contract
with an arbitration clause that was governed by the FAA.65 Justice Rehnquist
stated that the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court contravened the
terms of the contract, and was therefore pre-empted by the FAA.66
Early in the dissent, Justice Rehnquist clarified that the decision of "what to
submit to the arbitrator is a matter of contractual agreement," and contractual
interpretation falls within the power of the court, not the arbitrator.67 Justice
Rehnquist, following the reasoning of the Supreme Court in First Options of Chi-
cago v. Kaplan,68 concluded that just as central to an agreement of the parties as
what is submitted to the arbitrator is to whom it is submitted, and the whom is
therefore a question for the court to decide.69
59. Id. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79 (2002); AT & T Tech. v. Communica-
tions Workers, 475 U.S. 643 (1986); John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 373 U.S. 543 (1964).
60. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2407.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2409.
63. It is important to distinguish between the dissenting opinions in this case, as Justice Thomas
wrote a dissenting opinion as well. In Justice Thomas' dissent, he affirmed his belief that the FAA
does not apply to proceedings in state courts, and therefore would have left the South Carolina Su-
preme Court decision undisturbed. Id. at 2411. As stated above, Justice Stevens also dissented in part.
Id. at 2408.
64. Id. at 2411.
65. Id. at 2409.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
69. Id. Rehnquist based his reasoning on the following language from First Options:
Given the principle that a party can be forced to arbitrate only those issues it specifically has
agreed to submit to arbitration, one can understand why courts might hesitate to interpret silence
or ambiguity on the "who should decide arbitrability" point as giving the arbitrators that power,
for doing so might too often force unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they reasonably would
have thought a judge, not an arbitrator would decide.
Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2409 (quoting First Options, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995)).
20041
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Central to Justice Rehnquist's dissent is that he considered the language in the
contract to preclude class-wide arbitration. 70 Specifically, he argued that language
from the contract stating that any disputes arising out of the contracts "shall be
resolved by binding arbitration by one arbitrator selected by us with consent of
you"'71 wherein "us" was defined as "Green Tree" and "you" was defined as "Baz-
zle." 72 According to the dissenting Justices, this language expressly required that
each buyer agree to a particular arbitrator for disputes between Green Tree and the
specific buyer named in each contract.
73
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the agreement at issue was technically
silent as to class-wide arbitration, but noted that imposition of class-wide arbitra-
tion would contravene the terse language of the contract and therefore be pre-
empted by the FAA.74 Justice Rehnquist closed the dissenting opinion by stating
that the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court to allow class-wide arbitra-
tion had imposed a "regime that was contrary to the express agreement of the
parties" and that he would therefore reverse the judgment.
V. COMMENT
In Bazzle the Supreme Court was faced with an opportunity to settle the ongo-
ing debate concerning class-wide arbitration, but left the legal community with
more questions than before. The most obvious question still left unanswered after
Bazzle is whether class-wide arbitration should be permissible at all, and specifi-
cally whether it is permissible when an agreement is silent on the issue. Although
the plurality in Bazzle decided the case without clarifying the matter,76 Justice
Rehnquist's dissenting opinion was somewhat revealing as to what may be the
future of class-wide arbitration. The dissenting Justices, notably willing to decide
the issue, 77 saw it unnecessary to go any further than the language of the arbitra-
tion agreement to resolve the case. Emphasizing that arbitration agreements are to
70. Id. at 2410. Unfortunately neither the majority nor the dissent addressed the issue of whether or
not language in a contract explicitly precluding class-wide arbitration is permissible. However,
Rehnquists' opinion suggests that such language would in fact be permissible. This issue has been
addressed in detail in Ting v. AT& T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Cal. 2002), affd in part and rev'd in
part, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 53 (2003).
71. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2410.
72. In the agreement at issue in Bazzle, "you" was defined as "Bazzle," whereas in other agreements
"you" would have been defined by the name of the particular person named in that specific contract.
Id. at 2411.
73. Id. According to Rehnquist, this language made class-wide arbitration impermissible, as in
class-wide arbitration the imposition of a single arbitrator for the entire class would directly conflict
with the requirement that each specific buyer agree with Green Tree concerning an arbitrator for each
specific contract. Id.
74. Id. The central purpose of the FAA is to ensure that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced
according to their terms. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995). Any
attempt to impose class-wide arbitration when an agreement precluded class-wide arbitration would
directly conflict with the FAA, and therefore be pre-empted. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2410.
75. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2411.
76. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 67, 69 and accompanying text.
[Vol. I
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be enforced according to their terms, 78 the dissenting Justices concluded that the
terms of the agreement inherently precluded class-wide arbitration.79
Although the dissenting Justices disagreed with the South Carolina Supreme
Court decision and concluded that the agreement at issue, while technically silent,
precluded class-wide arbitration, the Justices never addressed whether it would be
permissible for an arbitration agreement to expressly preclude class-wide arbitra-
tion. The question evolved naturally from the language of the opinions, but nei-
ther the majority nor the dissenting Justices provided an answer as to whether this
was a green light for parties to insert "no class-wide arbitration clauses" in agree-
ments.
However, in light of the language of the opinions by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Stevens, ° it would appear that at least some of the Justices would
allow such preclusive language. This very issue was decided in Ting v. AT& T,81
wherein the Ninth Circuit upheld a California district court decision holding that
language expressly precluding class-wide arbitration rendered an agreement un-
conscionable. 82 The facts of Ting provide an exemplary depiction of the consumer
versus mega-corporation scenario that has been used by some commentators to
demonstrate the need for class-wide arbitration.
In the summer of 2000, in response to the new mandatory de-tariffing re-
quirements of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC),8 3 AT & T began
sending its customers a new Customer Service Agreement (CSA).s4 This CSA
would establish a new contract between AT & T and the customer governing the
78. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
79. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2410.
80. Id. at 2408. Justice Stevens stated in relevant part:
The Supreme Court of South Carolina has held as a matter of state law that class-action arbitra-
tions are permissible if not prohibited by the applicable arbitration agreement, and that the
agreement between these parties is silent on the issue. There is nothing in the Federal Arbitration
Act that precludes either of these determinations by the Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Id. (emphasis added).
81. 182 F. Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Cal. 2002), aJfd in part and rev'd in part, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir.
2003), cert. denied, No. 02-1251, 2003 WL 1988529 (S. Ct. Oct. 6, 2003).
82. Ting v. AT & T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Cal. 2002), affd in part and rev 'd in part, 319 F.3d
1126 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 53 (2003).
83. Id. At the time Congress enacted the Communications Act in 1934, AT & T was in control of
virtually the entire telephone service industry. Id. The Communications Act was enacted to address
the problems associated with corporations, such as AT & T, that enjoyed a monopoly over services.
Id. In order to effectuate this purpose, the Act required carriers to file a list of tariffs or schedules
showing all charges, among other information related to practices and regulations affecting the charges
with the FCC. Id. The basic goal of the Act was to enable all purchasers of communications services
to receive the same federally regulated rates. Id. Eventually courts developed the "filed rate doctrine"
and any state-law claim seeking to enforce a contract which provided terms that differed from those of
the filed rate would be pre-empted by federal law. Id. As technology advanced, and customers en-
joyed a greater selection of telecommunication providers, arguments began to surface questioning the
unnecessary costs to new entrants and collusive pricing that resulted from the "filed rate doctrine." Id.
After a long period of criticism and argument over the unfairness of the established tariff scheme,
Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Act). Id. The Act adopted the FCC's de-
tariffing rationale and sought to provide a "pro-competitive, deregulatory, national policy framework
by opening all telecommunications markets to competition." Id. Then, in October 1996, the FCC
issued an order of mandatory de-tarrifing, and thereby required all telecommunications carriers to
establish contracts with consumers which governed the rates, terms, and conditions of long distance
service. Id.
84. Id. at 1132.
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rates, terms, and conditions of long distance service.85 Within the CSA was a
section stating that resolution of disputes would be conducted through binding
arbitration and not by a judge or jury, or through a class action.86 The CSA also
prohibited the resolution of disputes in arbitration on a class-wide basis.87 The
court in Ting noted that absent the availability of class-wide arbitration it would
be economically impossible for individual consumers to pursue claims against AT
& T on an individual basis, and that many plaintiffs would therefore be unable to
obtain relief.88 The court dismissed the idea of applying federal preemption to the
case and held that the agreement was a violation of California unconscionability
law, and therefore unenforceable.89
In concluding that the agreement was both procedurally and substantively un-
conscionable, the court quickly dismissed several important arguments that AT &
T presented. On procedural grounds, the agreement was held unconscionable due
to the "take-it or leave-it" manner in which the agreement was presented to the
customers. 90 However, AT & T argued, and the court conceded, that customers
did have other options aside from AT & T long distance. 91 While it was true that
two-thirds of California long-distance providers contained similar arbitration
agreements in their CSAs, other providers, most notably Verizon, did not contain
such provisions. 92 The court reasoned that AT & T had dissuaded its customers
from seeking "meaningful choices" by responding to customer complaints about
the arbitration provisions by informing consumers that "all other major long-
distance providers have included an arbitration provision in their services agree-
ments. 93
On substantive grounds, the court focused on the advantages of the class-
action and concluded that a prohibition of the class-action would prevent consum-
ers from vindicating their rights, most notably those in which the stakes are
small. 94 The court went on to hold that the CSA was "effectively one-sided since
it is hard to conceive of a class action suit that AT & T would file against its cus-
tomers." 95 These arguments employed by the lower court, and affirmed by the
Ninth Circuit, are not entirely persuasive. The fact that "it is hard to conceive" of
a class-action by AT & T against consumers, or that consumers will be less likely
to pursue small claims, should not inevitably lead to a finding of unconscionabil-
ity. The court dismissed the availability of small-claims court, the ability to ob-
tain relief by petitioning the FCC, and individual arbitration as means for settling
disputes which do not inherently carry with them the high cost of litigation.
In concluding that the CSA was unconscionable the court also engaged in
mathematical analysis which was equally unpersuasive. The Legal Remedies
Provisions of the CSA stated that consumers with claims under $1,000, who were
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1133.
87. Id.
88. Ting, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 939.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 929.
91. Id.
92. Id. Verizon accounted for 8.8% of the market share for long-distance carriers. Id.
93. Id.
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willing to have disputes resolved by document review, could pay a $20 filing fee,
with AT & T paying the remainder of the fees associated with arbitration. 96 Sig-
nificantly, such a claim would also result in the American Arbitration Associa-
tions (AAA) Consumer Arbitration Rules being applied to each claim. 97 How-
ever, the court, in agreement with testimony by AT & T, pointed out that very few
claims under $1,000 were effectuated because more than ninety-nine percent of
these claims were resolved by customer care representatives.98 However, assum-
ing arguendo that no claims under $1,000 are ever brought, then who exactly are
these "small-stake" consumers which will not be able to vindicate their rights?
The court continues its analysis and appears to answer this question by introduc-
ing a hypothetical consumer with a $100,000 claim.99 According to the court's
calculations, under the new CSA this consumer would pay approximately $5,800
before arbitration even begins, 100 while a similar suit in court would cost her less
than $200 to file.' 0' The court concludes that having to advance such sums to
carry out arbitration of claims will "deter many litigants."'1 2 While not entirely
dispositive of the court's argument, it is not difficult to envision a consumer with
a $100,000 claim that would be willing to forego $5,800 to pursue the claim.
More significant is that the court says nothing of the fact that filing a claim in
court for under $200, based on $100,000 in claimed damages, would likely entail
much more than $5,800 in total expenses before the litigation terminates. This is
especially true when considering the cost of hiring expensive legal counsel to
oppose AT & T, a corporation with virtually unlimited resources to spend in liti-
gation in comparison to an individual consumer. Neither does the court analyze
the many benefits of pursuing such claims in the individual arbitration setting,
which would likely be less costly than the total cost involved in the $200 claim
filed in court. The court also concludes that AT & T had "severely limited the
damages a successful plaintiff may obtain and has prohibited ... the use of class
actions."' 0 3 This conclusion begs the question of how many consumers in a class-
action against AT & T will actually "obtain" the damages they have been awarded
when the cost of litigating such claim is in many cases a pool of funds being paid
to the representing attorneys. Recently, the Supreme Court was presented with the
opportunity to decide the issue on appeal in Ting, but rather continued its silence
with regard to class-wide arbitration and denied the request for certiorari. 104
Interestingly, prior to the Ting decision, both the Seventh Circuit and a New
Jersey appellate court had upheld similar agreements which also expressly pre-
96. Id. at 933-34.
97. Id. at 934.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. The court's calculations were as follows:
If her claim sought $100,000 and the arbitration was scheduled for four days, the initial filing fee
would be $1,250, there would be an extra service fee of $750, and there could be an arbitrator's
fee deposit of $3,800. Thus, a class member's potential cost before arbitration begins would be
$5,800.
Id.
101. Id. This number is presumably based on the cost of filing a claim in a California court during
this time period. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 935.
104. Ting, cert. denied, 124 S. Ct 53 (2003).
2004]
11
Bunch: Bunch: To Be Announced
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
cluded class-wide arbitration. 10 5 In fact, the Seventh Circuit case, as in Ting, in-
volved a dispute between AT & T and a consumer regarding AT & T's CSA.
10 6
In Boomer, the dispute was centered on language in the CSA which was identical
to the language of the CSA in Ting. 10 7 The plaintiff filed a class action against AT
& T in violation of the CSA's prohibition of such claims, and AT & T then filed a
motion to compel arbitration. 1° 8 The district court denied AT & T's motion to
compel arbitration and the plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment, and
AT & T appealed.'0 9 In contrast to the Ting case, wherein both the California
district court and the Ninth Circuit focused on unconscionability, the Seventh
Circuit analyzed the issue in terms of federal preemption. "0 AT & T argued that a
state law challenge to the validity of the arbitration clause in its CSA "violat[ed]
Congress's objective in passing the Communications Act.""' The Seventh Circuit
agreed with AT & T and upheld the agreement.l12
In support of its decision the court expressed three reasons why the state law
challenge to the validity of the arbitration clause was preempted." 3 First, the
court concluded that allowing state challenges to the CSA would result in custom-
ers receiving different terms depending on their locality. 14  This result would
conflict with congressional intent that customers receive uniform terms in condi-
tions of service, especially considering the number of national corporations that
use a single CSA for all customers." 15 This conclusion is particularly important to
the facts of Ting, as Ting illustrates how absent federal preemption, the same CSA
could lead to differing holdings (and therefore differing terms) from state to state.
Second, allowing arbitration clauses, such as the one in the CSA sent by AT & T,
allows corporations to offer lower rates." 6 To invalidate agreements containing
such clauses would permit discriminatory price structures. 1 7  Third, the court
105. Boomer v. AT & T, 309 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2002). The agreement at issue in Boomer stated in
relevant part:
No dispute may be joined with another lawsuit, or in an arbitration with a dispute of any other
person, or resolved on a class-wide basis, the arbitrator may not award damages that are barred
by this agreement and may not award punitive damages or attorney's fees unless such damages or
fees are expressly authorized by a statute, you and AT & T both waive any claims for an award
of damages that are excluded under this agreement.
ld at 410. (emphasis added). See also Gras v. Assocs. First Capital Corp., 786 A.2d 886 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2001) (upholding an agreement which expressly prohibited plaintiffs from bringing a
class action in the arbitration forum).
106. Boomer, 309 F.3d at 410. Ting did not explicitly identify the CSA at issue as identical to the one
in Boomer, although the language was in fact identical. Given the facts expressed in both opinions
concerning the CSAs, it is very likely that the CSA was the same in both cases. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 408.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 417.
I11. Id.
112. id.
113. Id. at 418.
114. Id.
115. Id. See, e.g., AT & T v. Centr. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214 (1998) ("It is that antidiscrimina-
tory policy which lies at the heart of the common-carrier section of the Communications Act.").
116. Boomer, 309 F.3d at 418.
117. Id. See, e.g., Metro E. Ctr. for Conditioning and Health v. Qwest Communications Int'l, Inc.,
294 F.3d 924 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that arbitration offers cost saving benefits to telecommunication
providers and that these benefits "reflected in a lower cost of doing business that in competition are
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concluded that Section 201 of the Communications Act demonstrated Congress's
intent that federal laws govern such long-distance service contracts.' 18 Consider-
ing the trend California has taken with respect to class-wide arbitration, it is no
surprise that the Ninth Circuit decided to create a split in the circuits rather than
follow preemption analysis employed by the Seventh Circuit decision in uphold-
ing such an agreement.
Commentators, unlike the Supreme Court, have been quite vocal on the issue.
This is not surprising considering the future of class-wide arbitration involves
significant implications for all parties who may potentially be involved in arbitra-
tion. 19 Proponents of class-wide arbitration argue that the combination of the
benefits of the class-action and arbitration presents a valuable tool in pursuing
relief against wealthier parties, such as corporations or big businesses. 20 Propo-
nents also argue that corporations have come to use mandatory arbitration clauses
as weapons 121 for precluding costly class-action litigation.' 22  Therefore, the
elimination of class-wide arbitration would force plaintiffs to arbitrate claims
individually, an alternative that arguably results in an advantage to the wealthier
party, and a disadvantage to the individual consumer.'
23
On the other hand, opponents of class-wide arbitration have dismissed the ad-
vantages of the process in light of the perceived disadvantages that grow from the
passed along to customers"). If arbitration clauses in some states are ruled unconscionable or illegal,
whereas in other states they are upheld, the corporations will be faced with three options: 1) increase
the rates of everyone, 2) only increase the rates of those living in litigation states (those that do not
allow the arbitration clause), or 3) leave all rates the same. Boomer, 309 F.3d at 419.
118. Boomer, 309 F.3d at 419. The Seventh Circuit noted that the following language of Section
201(b) of the Communications Act demonstrates congressional intent that federal law determine the
reasonableness of the terms and conditions of long-distance contracts, "All charges, practices, classifi-
cations, and regulations for and in connection with such communication service, shall be just and
reasonable, and any such charge, practice, classification or regulation that is unjust or unreasonable is
declared to be unlawful." 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000). Section 202(a) states:
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier to make any unjust or unreasonable discrimination in
charges, practices, classifications, regulations, facilities, or services for or in connection with like
communication service, directly or indirectly, by any means or device, or to make or give any
undue or unreasonable preference of advantage to any particular person, locality, or to subject
any particular person, class of persons, or locality, to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or dis-
advantage.
47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (emphasis added).
119. See supra Part I (noting the increasing number of form agreements relating to common con-
sumer transactions that contain arbitration clauses).
120. See Alan S. Kaplinksy & Mark J. Levin, Excuse Me, But Who's the Predator? Banks Can Use
Arbitration Clauses as a Defense, Bus. L. TODAY, May/June 1998, at 24 [hereinafter Kaplinsky &
Levin, Excuse Me]; Stemlight supra note 32, at 37-40; Andrea Lockridge, Note, The Silent Treatment:
Removing the Class Action from the Plaintiff's Toolbox Without Ever Saying a Word, 2003 J. DISP.
RESOL. 255, 267 (2003); Note, Classwide Arbitration: Efficient Adjudication or Procedural Quag-
mire?, 67 VA. L. REV. 787 (1981).
121. See Kaplinksy & Levin, Excuse Me, supra note 120, stating:
It is anticipated that virtually all major banks and lending institutions will implement consumer
arbitration procedures within the next five years. Lenders that have not yet implemented arbitra-
tion programs should promptly consider doing so, since each day that passes brings with it the
risk of additional multimillion-dollar class action lawsuits that might have been avoided had arbi-
tration procedures been in place.
Id. at 28.
122. See Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, 16 FRANCHISE L.J.
141, 142 (1997); Kaplinsky & Levin, Excuse Me, supra note 120; Stemlight, supra note 32, at 1-7.
123. Sternlight, supra note 32, at 1-7; Lockridge, supra note 120, at 267.
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importation of the class-action to the arbitration setting. 124  Some critics have
suggested that the decidedly pro-class-wide arbitration stance that California has
taken could potentially make the state "the class action capital of the country for
small consumer claims subject to arbitration agreements."'1 25
Some of the obvious advantages of the arbitration process over litigation in-
clude: the speed and affordability, the lower degree of hostility created by a less
adversarial environment, and the simpler procedural and evidentiary rules.
126
However, based on the purported inefficiencies of class-wide arbitration, particu-
larly the need for increased judicial activity, critics have argued that the process
presents no benefit in comparison to litigation.
27
The Keating decision,' 28 which may have been the first instance wherein a
court considered class-wide arbitration, 129 and the decision which established the
"California Approach," summarized some of the logistical disadvantages of class-
wide arbitration as follows:
Without doubt a judicially ordered classwide arbitration would entail a
greater degree of judicial involvement than is normally associated with
arbitration, ideally "a complete proceeding without resort to court facili-
ties." The court would have to make initial determinations regarding cer-
tification and notice to the class, and if classwide arbitration proceeds it
may be called upon to exercise a measure of external supervision in order
to safeguard the rights of absent class members to adequate representa-
tion and in the event of dismissal or settlement. A good deal of care, and
ingenuity, would be required to avoid judicial intrusion upon the merits
of the dispute, or upon the conduct of the proceedings themselves and to
minimize complexity, costs, or delay.
130
Therefore, when class-wide arbitration is chosen as the means to resolve
many similar claims, the many benefits of the arbitration process are lost in favor
of a procedural device which brings the burdens of litigation into the arbitral fo-
rum.13 1 It is somewhat ironic that the greatest advantages of arbitration are in
many instances the greatest disadvantages of litigation, yet class-wide arbitration
is sometimes pursued by parties despite the fact that it lessens the distinction be-
tween the two processes.
124. See Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, The Gold Rush of 2002: California Courts Lure Plain-
tiffs Lawyers (But Undermine Federal Arbitration Act) by Refusing to Enforce "No-Class Action"
Clauses in Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 58 BUS. LAW. 1289 (2003) [hereinafter Kaplinsky &
Levin, Gold Rush]; Stemlight, supra note 32, at 44-54.
125. Kaplinksy & Levin, Gold Rush, supra note 124.
126. Id. at 1297-98.
127. Id. See Stephen H. Kupperman & George C. Freeman 111, Achieving Justice in Arbitration:
Selected Topics in Securities Arbitration: Rule 15C2-2, Fraud, Duress, Unconscionability, Waiver,
Class Arbitration, Punitive Damages, Rights of Review, and Attorney's Fees and Costs, 65 TUL. L.
REV. 1547, 1578 (1991); Stemlight, supra note 32.
128. Keating v. Southland Corp., 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982), rev'd in part on other grounds, South-
land Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
129. Sternlight, supra note 32, at 38.
130. Keating, 645 P.2d at 1209 (citations omitted).
131. Kaplinksy & Levin, Gold Rush, supra note 124.
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Aside from the logistical disadvantages of class-wide arbitration, there is also
concern that businesses and larger parties may abandon arbitration as a means for
settling disputes because class-wide arbitration presents the possibility of a single
representative "championing" the cause of similarly situated potential plaintiffs. 1
32
The defending parties may reason that the possibility of an unreviewable arbitral
error is too great a risk in comparison to the cost of settling, 133 or going through
the litigation process, which will at least be more punitive to the plaintiffs.
134
Other arguments against the process focus on the fact that there are numerous
avenues other than class-wide arbitration by which a plaintiff can pursue relief.
135
By agreeing to forego class-wide arbitration a party has not signed away any
rights to pursue relief individually, in fact the presumably advantageous individual
arbitration setting is still available. Furthermore, the advantage of confidentiality
associated with individual arbitration is weakened in the class setting, as extreme
caution would be required to maintain the confidentiality of each individual claim,
and at the same time satisfy the notice requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 23.
In addition, in many agreements the possibility of pursuing relief in small
claims court would still be available, 136 as would any substantive rights and reme-
dies against a party.' 37 In 1998, the American Arbitration Association (AAA)
established a Consumer Due Process Protocol. 38 This protocol establishes "clear
benchmarks for conflict resolution processes involving consumers."' 39 Within the
protocol are plain indications by the AAA that arbitration agreements should give
consumers "notice of the option to make use of applicable small claims court pro-
cedures as an alternative to binding arbitration in appropriate cases; and, a clear
statement of the means by which the Consumer may exercise the option (if any) to
submit disputes to arbitration or to court process."'140  In addition to the above
provision, the Protocol includes a range of provisions which seek to ensure the
due process rights of parties to arbitration are secured. 141
Given the apparent shortcomings of the class-wide arbitration process, and
the fact that courts which have allowed class-wide arbitration do so with reserva-
132. Id. at 1299; Kupperman & Freeman, supra note 127.
133. Kaplinksy & Levin, Gold Rush, supra note 124. Authors Kaplinksy & Levin argue that class-
wide arbitration presents the same risks as a class action litigation. Id. They cite numerous cases that
reason that parties to class actions may abandon litigation in favor of settling a dispute when these
risks arise. Id. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978) (stating that
"L[c]ertification of a large class may so increase the defendant's potential damages liability and litiga-
tion costs that he may find it economically prudent to settle and to abandon a meritorious defense");
Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 259 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that "[c]lass certification places
inordinate or hydraulic pressure on defendants to settle"); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d
1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that "[c]lass certification may require defendants to 'stake their
companies on the outcome of a single jury trial').




138. American Arbitration Assocation, Consumer Due Process Protocol (May 1998), available at
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tion, 142 it is not unreasonable to question the relative merits of such a process.
Although the possibility of leaving individual consumers without any avenue to
pursue relief is not by any means a favored outcome, to employ a procedural de-
vice which negates the very advantages of arbitration as an alternative form of
dispute resolution is equally unfavorable. In light of the alternatives available
even in the absence of class-wide arbitration, such as small claims court or indi-
vidual arbitration, it should not be said that plaintiffs would be left without alter-
natives, especially because these alternatives may not necessitate the hiring of
costly legal counsel. Furthermore, even though on its face class-wide arbitration
would appear to combine the intrinsic advantages of both arbitration and the class-
action, the great disadvantages associated with the process, combined with the
poor reasoning sometimes used to justify class-wide arbitration 43 simply point
toward the need for legislative or judicial reform.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the failure by both state courts and lower federal courts to create a uni-
fied body of law regarding class-wide arbitration, it is likely that the Supreme
Court will at some point squarely decide the issue. However, until that time par-
ties will be left to draft arbitration agreements keeping in mind the little guidance,
and less than uniform opinions, that have been expressed by the lower courts.
Assuming, as the South Carolina Supreme Court did, that a silent agreement does
not preclude class-wide arbitration, it is not unlikely that more and more parties
will begin drafting clauses to expressly preclude class-wide arbitration. 144 This
alternative presents the problem of potential forum shopping by corporations who
may be prohibited from using such an arbitration clause in one jurisdiction within
its reach, while being permitted to do so in another jurisdiction within its reach.
Upon consideration of the dissent in Bazzle, it appears that at least a segment
of the Supreme Court is sympathetic to the idea of allowing an arbitration clause
to expressly preclude class-wide arbitration. 145 This language, considered along
with the Ting line of decisions, 146 which have failed to establish a uniform body of
law on this issue, makes the debate even more complex. Bazzle presented an ideal
case in which the Supreme Court could have settled both whether class-arbitration
is possible when an agreement is silent, and whether express language precluding
class-wide arbitration is permissible. Unfortunately neither question was clearly
answered in Bazzle, and the disagreement between the lower courts on these is-
sues is sure to continue. In light of the Court's apparent unwillingness to settle the
disagreements concerning class-wide arbitration, parties should consider looking
142. See, e.g., Keating v. Southland Corp., 645 P.2d 1192, 1209 (Cal. 1982), rev'd in part on other
grounds, Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (stating that "[c]lass-wide arbitration, as Sir
Winston Churchill said of democracy, must be evaluated, not in relation to some ideal but in relation to
its alternatives").
143. See, e.g., Sternlight supra note 32, at 84-89 (criticizing the analogy between consolidation and
class arbitration). The South Carolina Supreme Court considered this analogy in reaching its conclu-
sion that class-wide arbitration should not be precluded when an agreement is silent. See Bazzle v.
Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 358 (S.C. 2002).
144. See Stemlight, supra note 32, at 6; Hollis et al., supra note 30, at 479.
145. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402, 2408-11 (2003).
146. See supra notes 81-118 and accompanying text.
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to Congress for resolution in this area of the law rather than hoping for the Su-
preme Court to decide the issue.
JONATHAN R. BUNCH
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